Washington is actively discussing whether to deploy nuclear-capable aircraft in additional European NATO countries, according to a Financial Times report — a move that would expand the alliance’s nuclear footprint eastward at a moment when the arms control landscape is in freefall.

Three people briefed on the discussions told the FT that US officials had signaled openness to expanding dual-capable aircraft (DCA) deployments beyond the six European nations that currently host them. Poland and several Baltic states have expressed interest in potentially hosting DCA bases, the report said. An agreement is not imminent.

The White House, Pentagon, and NATO did not respond to requests for comment. Reuters could not independently verify the report.

The current nuclear map

NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement has been a cornerstone of transatlantic defense since the Cold War. The United States forward-deploys nuclear weapons in Europe and maintains absolute control over them. Host nations contribute aircraft capable of delivering those weapons and train personnel accordingly.

Currently, six NATO members participate. Germany and Italy have been the longest-serving, per the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), with “more experience of direct participation in US extended nuclear deterrence than other Europeans.” NATO says it has reduced its land-based nuclear stockpile by more than 90 percent since the Cold War’s peak but continues to modernize capabilities and increase their “flexibility and adaptability.”

Adding new host countries — particularly on NATO’s eastern edge — would represent the most significant shift in the alliance’s nuclear posture in decades.

The logic and the paradox

The discussions reflect a strategic calculation layered with contradiction. The Trump administration wants to reduce America’s conventional military footprint in Europe. Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby told NATO defense ministers in February 2026 that roughly 85,000 US troops would deploy “in a more limited and focused fashion,” with Europe taking “the lead for its conventional defence.”

Colby argued at the Munich Security Conference that Washington had “over-assured” its European partners in the post-Cold War decades and that some “anxiety” would motivate faster European rearmament. The message was consistent: pull back on conventional forces, maintain the nuclear umbrella.

Expanding DCA hosting to Poland or the Baltic states fits that framework — more nuclear burden-sharing with fewer American boots on the ground. It would also place nuclear-capable aircraft closer to Russia’s western border, tightening the alliance’s deterrence posture along its most vulnerable frontier.

But the move carries escalatory risks. Stationing nuclear-capable bombers in countries that border Russia or its ally Belarus would almost certainly provoke a response from Moscow, which has spent years citing NATO expansion as justification for its own military posture.

The arms control vacuum

These talks arrive in a strategic environment where the arms control architecture that once gave structure to nuclear competition in Europe has eroded badly. NATO’s official position remains that it is “committed to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation” — even as the alliance continues to modernize its nuclear capabilities and increase what it calls their “flexibility and adaptability.”

NATO describes the circumstances in which it might use nuclear weapons as “extremely remote.” The alliance has not publicly addressed how expanding deployments to new host nations closer to Russian territory affects that assessment.

European skepticism

European attitudes toward nuclear deterrence are also shifting — but not in ways Washington would welcome. Polling by the ECFR in May and November 2025 found that respondents across eight European countries now tend to support developing an alternative European nuclear deterrent independent of the United States.

Fewer Europeans than ever consider the US under President Trump “an ally that shares our interests and values,” the ECFR noted, citing Trump’s campaign-trail suggestion that Russia attack “delinquent” allies and his broader skepticism toward NATO commitments.

Conversations in European capitals increasingly center on whether France and Britain — the continent’s two nuclear-armed states — could form the core of an independent deterrent. French President Emmanuel Macron had an address on nuclear deterrence scheduled for March 2026, which ECFR analysts expected to draw particular scrutiny.

What comes next

Any expansion would require agreement within NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group and likely years of infrastructure development. Poland has long sought a closer security relationship with Washington; hosting nuclear-capable aircraft would deepen that tie considerably. The Baltic states, smaller and more exposed, face a different calculation: whether the deterrent benefit outweighs the risk of becoming a priority target.

For now, the talks are exactly that. But the direction of travel is clear. The alliance is reshuffling its nuclear cards, and the places they land will shape European security for years to come.

Sources