Seventeen corporate executives. A $30 billion trade package. A war that refuses to go according to plan.

When President Donald Trump’s plane touched down in Beijing this week for his summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping, the passenger list told its own story about who shapes American trade policy in 2026. The CEOs of Tesla, Nvidia, and more than a dozen other major US companies made the trip — not as observers, but as participants in a negotiation that could reshape the economic relationship between the world’s two largest economies.

The timing is not accidental. Trump arrives in China 75 days into a war with Iran that has scrambled global energy markets, driven US petrol prices to punishing highs, and forced the president to contemplate the kind of diplomatic concessions he has spent his political career denouncing. According to Reuters, Trump and Xi are set to weigh tariff cuts on roughly $30 billion of imports — a “managed trade” approach that signals neither full confrontation nor genuine rapprochement.

The CEO Delegation and the Price of Access

Trump previewed the trip with characteristic bluntness. In a social media post, he said he would ask Xi to “open up” China so the visiting executives could “work their magic” and “help bring the People’s Republic to an even higher level.” He called it his “very first request” to his counterpart.

The framing was revealing. The president of the United States was presenting American corporate leaders not as supplicants seeking market access, but as gifted technocrats whose talents China would be fortunate to receive. Whether Beijing sees it that way is another matter.

The presence of at least 17 CEOs on the trip underscores a structural feature of US-China relations that predates Trump: when the two governments negotiate, American corporate heavyweights are not just stakeholders but active participants. Their factories, supply chains, and revenue streams sit in the crosshairs of every tariff decision. Bringing them along is both a signal of seriousness and an acknowledgment of who actually bears the cost of trade wars.

The Iran Calculus

Trade is the stated purpose of the visit. The war in Iran is the subtext neither side can ignore.

China is the world’s largest importer of Iranian oil. The Hormuz blockade and the US naval siege on Iranian ports have squeezed Beijing’s energy supplies, even though China has built up strategic petroleum reserves that cushioned the immediate blow. Both Washington and Beijing want the Strait of Hormuz reopened. Their preferred methods for achieving that goal could not be more different.

Trump has spent weeks threatening Iran with escalated military strikes, while Iran has refused direct talks until Washington lifts its naval blockade. A US military attempt to force Hormuz open earlier this month lasted less than 48 hours without significantly increasing traffic through the strait, according to Al Jazeera’s reporting.

Xi, by contrast, proposed a “four-point plan to safeguard and promote Middle East peace and stability” in April — a vaguely worded framework emphasizing peaceful coexistence, respect for sovereignty, international law, and a “balanced approach to development and security.” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araghchi last week, with Beijing’s Foreign Ministry calling a comprehensive ceasefire “of utmost urgency.”

Christopher Heurlin, an associate professor of government and Asian studies at Bowdoin College, told Al Jazeera that Beijing has been “positioning themselves as someone who might possibly be helpful” on Iran but has been “holding off on putting any pressure on Iran to end the conflict, just waiting for this visit.”

The calculation is straightforward. China has leverage over Iran through trade ties. Trump needs help reopening Hormuz. Xi knows it.

Taiwan and the Price of Help

Analysts interviewed by Al Jazeera were unanimous on one point: if China helps the US on Iran, the bill will arrive in the form of concessions on Taiwan.

Inderjeet Parmar, professor of international politics at City St George’s, University of London, described Trump as heading to China “chastened” by the shortcomings of the Iran war. “He needs Chinese support for opening the Strait of Hormuz,” Parmar said. “China needs the Strait of Hormuz to open for its own reasons — of oil and energy from Iran and so on. At the same time, they can use this as leverage regarding Taiwan.”

A $14 billion arms package for Taiwan — approved by Congress — currently sits on Trump’s desk unsigned. Heurlin said the Chinese are “going to be trying to convince Trump not to go forward with this weapon sale agreement.”

Trump, for his part, has insisted he does not need Xi’s help on Iran. Before departing, he declared the conflict “very much under control.” The domestic political picture tells a different story: petrol prices are skyrocketing, inflation is climbing, and the president’s approval ratings are sinking. The Economist captured the dynamic last month with a cover featuring Xi looking at Trump alongside a quote attributed to Napoleon: “Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.”

William Yang, senior analyst for Northeast Asia at the International Crisis Group, described the dilemma more carefully: “Washington understands that it may need Beijing’s help to nudge Iran back to the negotiating table, but it is also aware of the implications of directly seeking support from Beijing to end the blockade, as it would likely mean giving China the upper hand in the bilateral relations.”

Managed Trade or Managed Decline?

The $30 billion in potential tariff cuts represents neither a reset nor a capitulation. It is, in the Reuters characterization, a “managed trade push” — an attempt to reduce the most economically damaging elements of the tariff regime while preserving the strategic architecture of economic competition.

This approach has precedents, none of them especially encouraging. Managed trade deals between major economies tend to favor the party with more leverage at the moment of negotiation. Right now, that party is not the United States.

The broader question hovering over the summit is whether US-China economic interdependence is being rebuilt or merely renegotiated. The two economies remain deeply intertwined despite years of tariffs, export controls, and rhetorical hostility. The presence of 17 American CEOs in Beijing is evidence of that entanglement — and of the fact that the companies themselves have no intention of disentangling.

What they want is predictability. What Trump wants is a deal he can sell as a victory. What Xi wants is strategic advantage at a moment when his chief competitor is distracted by a war it cannot seem to end.

Those three desires overlap in a narrow band of possible outcomes centered on modest tariff reductions, vague language on Iran, and silence on Taiwan. Whether that band is wide enough to produce an agreement — or whether the summit produces only photographs and press releases — will become clear in the days ahead.

Sources