Seventeen days into the Iran war, the American foreign policy establishment has split into two camps, each convinced the other is delusional. Eliot Cohen, writing in The Atlantic, argues they’re both right — about each other.

The hawks look at the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the scale of the joint U.S.-Israeli assault, and see vindication. The administration’s failure to build allied support, its incoherent public messaging, the absence of a visible endgame — these are, in their telling, venial sins. Tactical brilliance covers a multitude of strategic gaps. Cohen’s counter is blunt: no war stays won without domestic support, and with oil prices climbing and Trump’s own base restless, that foundation is cracking. Strategic malpractice is not a footnote. It is the story.

The doves, meanwhile, have a cleaner narrative: the war was unnecessary, the execution reckless, the consequences predictable. All true, as far as it goes. But Cohen identifies the blind spot they refuse to examine — the Iran problem itself. The regime’s threat was severe. Every prior attempt to contain it through diplomacy, sanctions, or strategic patience failed. Opponents of this war have yet to articulate what would have worked instead.

U.S. intelligence assessments, reported by The Washington Post, suggest the regime is consolidating rather than collapsing, with the IRGC tightening control. A former Iran desk officer argues in Foreign Affairs that Tehran may now set the terms for peace. Neither outcome was in the hawks’ briefing slides.

The uncomfortable truth is that both camps are offering half-analyses dressed as complete ones. The war may have been necessary and still be going badly. These are not contradictory positions — they are the same position, held by almost nobody.

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